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Tomasz Pawelec
The Freudian “Hermeneutics of Suspicion”
and Historical Source Critique
Abstract: The article concerns some aspect of the impact which psychoanalysis (depth 
psychology) had on the research practice of historiography. The author asks in what 
ways “psychoanalytic thinking” modified the handling of a historical source. He argues 
that the basis for the modification was a unique “hermeneutics of suspicion,” embedded 
in depth psychology. At the core of this hermeneutics is the attitude of a psychoanalytic 
therapist—a search for “a deeper meaning” of a particular psychopathological symptom, 
a meaning cunningly concealed but at the same time indirectly (and perversely) enacted 
and communicated by this symptom. The article identifies the main reasons for herme-
neutics of suspicion penetrating historians’ way of thinking: “ontological” (connected with 
the specific view of the historical process adopted by historiographers of psychoanalytic 
sympathies) and “methodological” (related to the discovery and affirmation of the method-
ological “kinship” between researching history and practicing psychoanalysis). The author 
further argues that, contrary to superficial readings, psychoanalytic hermeneutics of sus-
picion is not just a radicalized version of the critical attitude towards the source, which 
by default marks scientific historiography in its various forms, but that it goes beyond it 
in important ways. The article considers also various practical consequences of the pres-
ence of this kind of hermeneutics in handling historical sources..
Keywords: “hermeneutics of suspicion,” philosophical criticism, critical attitude, 
historiography, psychohistory, historical process, historical source, psychoanalysis
The Specificity and Ambiguity of Psychoanalysis
The psychoanalysis created over one hundred years ago by Sigmund 
Freud has penetrated—and in some cases also decidedly changed—
many areas of human existence.1 It has also influenced many sciences 
1 Regarding the holistic attempt at estimating the global influence of psychoanalysis 
on the human reality of the last century and the diagnosis of its present condition, see E. Zaretsky, 
Secrets of the Soul: A Social and Cultural History of Psychoanalysis (New York: Knopf, 2004). 
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on man, including historiography. In this last case, it has also contrib-
uted in a decisive way to the rise of a separate research orientation, 
which programmatically deals with the psychological dimension of the past 
and is generally called psychohistory.2 But it was not just the “broaden-
ing” of the field of historical research as a result of the addition of a new 
area of investigation3 that was the most important: it was the “meeting” 
of history and depth psychology, leading to various elements of “psychoan-
alytic thinking” taking root in the methodological awareness and empiri-
cal research practices of at least some historians, that turned out to be 
key. The presence of these elements became visible in various fields. They 
Cf. also N. Ginsburg, R. Ginsburg, eds., Psychoanalysis and Culture at the Millennium 
(New Haven: Yale University Press: 1999).
2 The definitional quality of psychohistory is its programmatic reference to psychological 
theory as the basis of conducting research or interpreting historical phenomena. Formally 
speaking, many theoretical “options” may come into play here and many have been tested, but only 
the psychology of depth has been able to take a clearer and more enduring hold in professional 
historiography. This is precisely why the term “psychohistory” is commonly understood as a synonym 
for “psychoanalytic history.” For general information on this subject, see: T. Pawelec, Dzieje 
i nieświadomość. Założenia teoretyczne i praktyka badawcza psychohistorii (Katowice: Wydawnictwo 
Uniwersytetu Śląskiego, 2004); J. Szaluta, Psychohistory: Theory and Practice (New York: Peter 
Lang, 1999); P. Loewenberg, “Psychohistory. An Overview of the Field,” in: P. Loewenberg, Decoding 
the Past: The Psychohistorical Approach (New Brunswick–London: Transaction Publishers, 1996), 
pp. 14–41. Regarding “non-psychoanalytic alternatives” in the field of psychohistorical investigation, 
see M. Dymkowski, Wprowadzenie do psychologii historycznej (Gdańsk: GWP, 2003); T. Ochinowski, 
“Nie tylko psychoanaliza. Wybrane programy współpracy badawczej historii i psychologii,” 
Historyka, Vol. 32, 2002, pp. 63–88; W. M. Runyan, “Alternatives to Psychoanalytic Psychobiograpy,” 
in: Psychology and Historical Interpretation, W. M. Runyan, ed. (New York–Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 1988), pp. 219–244; W. M. Runyan, “Reconceptualizing the Relations Between History 
and Psychology,” in: Psychology and Historical Interpretation, pp. 247–295.
3 It is worth noting that historians have really always been interested in the psychological aspect 
of history. This was accented by scholars of such differing prominence as Johann G. Droysen (“Every 
so-called historical fact […] is a compound of favorable or unfavorable acts of will”) and Marc Bloch 
(“Historical facts are, in essence, psychological facts. That is why they are usually the consequences 
of other psychological facts”). This was connected with the dominance—so characteristic of all 
varieties of classical historiography, especially—of the perspective of direct anthropomorphization. 
From such a perspective, the fundamental objects of investigation are the individual and collective 
decisions and actions of human subjects. Asking about their goals and motives, desires and fears, 
emotions or passions, in essence, we pose a question (at least implicit) of a psychological nature. 
In reality, the change consists in the recognition of the autonomy and cognitive specificity of this 
aspect (or dimension) of historical investigation vis-à-vis the remaining types of historical 
questions addressed by scholars of history. J. G. Droysen, Zarys historyki, trans. M. Bonecki, 
J. Duraj (Bydgoszcz: Epigram, 2012), p. 28 (Outline of Principles of History [Boston: Ginn, 1897]; 
original edition: 1868/1882); M. Bloch, Pochwała historii, czyli o zawodzie historyka (Warszawa: 
PWN, 1958), p. 221. More systematically on the challenges of studying the motivational side 
of history—D. H. Fischer, Historians’ Fallacies: Toward a Logic of Historical Thought (London: 
Harper & Row, 1970), pp. 187–215. More on the epistemological consequences of direct 
anthropomorphization: W. Wrzosek, O myśleniu historycznym (Bydgoszcz: Epigram, 2009), pp. 41–50.
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influenced, among other things, the way these scholars understood histori-
cal reality (that is, the conceptualization of the area of research), the forms 
and strategies of the explanations and historical interpretations they con-
structed, the shape and character of the narrative, and, last but not least, 
their attitude towards sources as the empirical basis of historiography. 
The text hereby presented concerns the latter issue. In considering how 
“psychoanalytical thinking” has modified work with sources in historiogra-
phy, I argue that the basis of these modifications is a certain “hermeneutics 
of suspicion,” “built into” depth psychology. I will also attempt to answer 
the question of whether such hermeneutics successfully took root within 
the wider historical profession.
I would like to note that in this article I consciously make use 
of the general term “psychoanalytic thinking,” despite its obvious 
vagueness. In using it, I would like to accentuate the basic message 
of my argument—the thesis about the peculiar character of the reasoning 
that makes up this “thinking”: to reason in a psychoanalytic way means 
to participate in a very special mental reality that diverges from the one 
created by the sphere of colloquial thought. 
The assimilation of the rules of psychoanalytic reasoning by a given 
subject (especially by way of analytic training or the experience of psy-
chotherapy, less frequently through the study of the appropriate lit-
erature) means gestalt switch in regard to more than just the sphere 
of colloquial experience. The “thought style”4 of the advocates of psycho-
analysis also seems distinct in regard to the majority of “thought styles” 
that dominate the field of human sciences. We can even speak of its 
fundamental incommensurability with them. All reflection on the pres-
ence of psychoanalysis in philosophy, historiography, sociology, anthro-
pology, political science, literary studies, etc., means, in essence, study-
4 I use this term in the sense proposed by Ludwik Fleck: “[…] directed perception, 
with corresponding mental and objective assimilation of what has been so perceived. 
It is characterized by common features in the problems of interest to a thought collective, 
by the judgement which the thought collective considers evident, and by the methods which 
it applies as a means of cognition.” L. Fleck, Genesis and Development of a Scientific Fact (Chicago: 
Chicago University Press, 1979), p. 99.
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ing the effects of depth psychology’s intellectual “invasion” of these fields. 
These investigations belong, on the one hand, to the history of ideas, 
on the other—to the history of science. This article can be seen as a con-
tribution to both these areas of study, concentrating on (or, better yet, lim-
ited to) the problem of empirical references in historiography.5
In the beginning, it is worth noting that demonstrating the various 
dimensions of the uniqueness of the psychoanalytic thought in-depthly 
and adequately would require an extensive reconstruction of its prem-
ises and the resulting perceptions, attitudes, and directives of action 
in various spheres (from science and therapy to daily life6). Such a recon-
struction is impossible here due to space constraints, but an interested 
reader may find such reconstructions without a problem in the extensive 
secondary literature.7 However, it is worth indicating that the essential 
premise of the psychoanalytical “style of thinking” is the very ambiguity 
of the phenomenon called psychoanalysis. Above all, it constitutes a cer-
tain (not completely homogeneous) type of a therapeutic approach in psy-
chiatric and psychological clinical practice, aimed at not only treating 
psychological disorders, but also at perfecting character. At the same time, 
5 From the stricter perspective of metahistorical reflection, they belong, on the one hand, 
to the history of historiography, and on the other hand, to the pragmatic methodology of history.
6 A number of popular works intended to promulgate the psychoanalytic approach in the daily 
life of “average people” are available on the publishing markets world-wide. See, e.g., A. Kokoszka, 
Psychoanalityczne ABC (Kraków: Universitas, 1997); V. Albisetti, W poszukiwaniu szczęścia. 
Psychoterapia dla wszystkich (Kraków: WAM, 2001); original edition: V. Albisetti, Per essere felici: 
psicoterapia per tutti (Milano: Edizioni paoline, 1991).
7 In my opinion, the most convenient guide to this literature for Polish readers would be that 
of Peter Gay—renowned historian of psychoanalysis, and possibly best biographer of Sigmund Freud 
up to date. See the extensive “Biographical Essay” included in his opus magnum titled Freud: A Life 
for Our Time (New York: W. W. Norton, 1988}; Polish edition—P. Gay, Freud. Życie na miarę epoki 
(Poznań: Zysk i S-ka, 2003). Noted there (and usually briefly discussed) are the most significant 
positions regarding the main issues of psychoanalysis, representative “manifests” and model studies 
from its particular “schools” or “branches,” and, finally, the most important polemical and critical 
works in the fields of psychology and philosophy. A good juxtaposition of the key texts is also included 
in P. Kutter’s book, Współczesna psychoanaliza. Psychologia procesów nieświadomych (Gdańsk: 
GWP, 1998); original edition: P. Kutter, Moderne psychoanalyse: eine Einführung in die Psychologie 
unbewusster Prozesse (Stuttgart: Verlag Internationale Psychoanalyse, 1989). Among valuable 
Polish publications, particularly worth mentioning are: Z. Rosińska, Psychoanalityczne myślenie 
o sztuce (Warszawa: PWN, 1985); P. Dybel, Dialog i represja. Antynomie psychoanalizy Zygmunta 
Freuda (Warszawa: IFiS PAN, 1995); P. Dybel, Okruchy psychoanalizy. Teoria Freuda pomiędzy 
hermeneutyką a poststrukturalizmem (Kraków: Universitas, 2009); M. Sokolik, ed., Problemy 
współczesnej psychoanalizy (Warszawa: Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu Warszawskiego, 1992); 
Z. Rosińska, J. Michalik, P. Bursztyka, eds., Freud i nowoczesność (Kraków: Universitas, 2008).
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however, it is a particular method of studying/reconstructing the con-
tents of unconscious psychological processes and investigating the mech-
anisms that regulate them. Simultaneously, it is accepted that the cog-
nitive effects flowing from the use of this method have therapeutic power. 
In other words: the use of this method for examining the unconscious 
of those who suffer brings these people relief. Thus, therapy becomes cog-
nitive exploration, or vice versa: investigation is tantamount to treatment.8
In a further understanding, psychoanalysis is also defined—
this is already the third view—as a certain general conception (or theory) 
of psychology of man, first formulated by Freud and gradually developed/
modified as a generalization or (as some analysts would have it) a “read-
er’s digest” of the practical experience of successive generations of thera-
pists. In time, this conception became one of the most important theoreti-
cal perspectives of twentieth-century psychology. Finally, in the fourth 
understanding, we can speak about a certain general conception of human 
nature—a particular view of man that aspires to be a holistic philosophy 
of man and of culture. It remains a “superstructure” over psychoanaly-
sis as a theory in the field of psychology. On the one hand, it is present 
in various fields of philosophical reflection, on the other—it serves some 
analysts in undertaking “cognitive excursions” into the fields of anthro-
pology, sociology, history, art history, or biography. All of these endeavors 
are known as applied psychoanalysis.9
8 During a session, the analyst explains the patient’s unconscious meanings of the actions 
and symbolic messages. The therapist, as Freud formulated it, “makes the unconscious conscious,” 
and it was precisely this that produced the healing effects.
9 The striking impression of the psychology of depth’s ambiguity does not disappear when we 
limit ourselves only to the scientific and cognitive plane of psychoanalytic activity. It has long been 
emphasized that psychoanalysis as a paradigm or “research program” (I use this term in Imre 
Lakatos’ understanding—I. Lakatos, “Falsification and the Methodology of Scientific Research 
Programmes,” in: I. Lakatos, The Methodology of Scientific Research Programmes, vol. 1, [Cambridge–
New York: Cambridge University Press, 1980], pp. 8–101) of investigating the human world, 
demonstrates characteristics inclined both towards the interpretation of humanities, and those 
that are usually tied with naturalistic and nomologistic natural sciences. Moreover—as a result 
of the therapeutic “sensitivity” irremovably built into it—it demonstrates traits of a science that 
is socially (and culturally) engaged, a certain “emancipative discipline” that programmatically 
undertakes (or is ready to undertake) the challenge of changing the social world “for the better.” 
In regards to this, see P. Kutter, Współczesna psychoanaliza…, pp. 56–64. Cf. E. Zaretsky, Secrets 
of the soul….
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“Hermeneutics of Suspicion”:  
A Cognitive Implication of the Theory of the Unconscious
If I were to indicate a basic element, the most essential component 
of constitutive importance for the emergence of the unique thought 
process, proper to psychoanalysis, it would be—not only in my opin-
ion—the idea of a dynamically-understood unconscious. (This idea con-
stitutes the fundamental premise of depth psychology,10 both in the onto-
logical dimension and beyond). Equally important to indicate would be 
its implications for the psychoanalytic understanding of the essential 
nature of human reality (i.e.: for the psychoanalytic “view of the world 
and of man”). This idea directly conditioned the shape of a unique cog-
nitive approach—an approach constitutive for the activity of psychoana-
lysts—which I call here the “hermeneutics of suspicion.”11
According to Freud and his followers, the processes inaccessible 
to consciousness determine the psychological life of man and consti-
tute the main source of his thereto related problems.12 The unconscious 
10 “If Freud’s discovery had to be summed up in a single word, that word would without doubt 
have to be ‘unconscious’”—write the authors of the authoritative dictionary of psychoanalysis. 
J. Laplanche, J.-B. Pontalis, The Language of Psycho-Analysis (London: Hogarth Press, 1973), p. 473. 
For a more extensive definition of this category, see: J. Laplanche, J.-B. Pontalis, The Language 
of Psycho-Analysis, pp. 473–476. Cf. the definitions in other, similar works: S. Fhanér, Słownik 
psychoanalizy (Gdańsk: GWP, 1996), pp. 134–137; original edition: S. Fhanér, Psychoanalytiskt 
Lexikon (Stockholm: Norstedt, 1989); B. Moore, B. Fine, eds., Słownik psychoanalizy. Klasyczne 
pojęcia, nowe koncepcje (Warszawa: Jacek Santorski & Co., 1996), pp. 178–179; original edition: 
B. Moore, B. Fine, eds., Psychoanalytic Terms and Concepts (New Haven: Yale University 
Press, 1990).
11 It seems that it is already at this point that we must provide an initial explanation 
to the basic category underlying the reflections presented here. The thesis that psychoanalysis 
is a type of hermeneutics—the art of interpreting what is “symbolic” (or, in a more cautious formula: 
what can be perceived/practiced as such) has long been present in the philosophical discourse, 
as well as in the minds of members of the psychoanalytic environment. We can cite such names 
as: Paul Ricoeur, Jürgen Habermas, Alfred Lorenzer, Karl Jaspers (on the philosophical plane), 
or Roy Schafer, Ludwik Binswanger, H. J. Möller, George Klein, Jacques Lacan (within the area 
of the psychoanalytic movement). More on this subject in: P. Dybel, Dialog i represja…, cz. II; P. Dybel, 
Okruchy psychoanalizy…, pp. 153–283, 335–386; K. Pajor, Psychoanaliza Freuda po stu latach 
(Warszawa: Eneteia, 2009), pp. 314–322; A. Pawliszyn, Skryte podstawy rozumienia. Hermeneutyka 
a psychoanaliza (Gdańsk: Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu Gdańskiego, 1993). In connection 
to the above, it is valid to describe the cognitive approach (and activity) practised by psychoanalysts 
as “hermeneutics.” I will attempt to demonstrate the validity of using the descriptive term “suspicion” 
in the further part of the article. 
12 The following presentation of selected theses in psychoanalysis is simplified in the sense 
that it omits the (often essential) evolution both in terms of understanding certain specific 
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“never rests”: the contents present within it actively attempt to break 
through to the sphere of consciousness, which the processes of denial 
(and other defense mechanism) oppose. Thanks to the so-called function 
of censorship, this may happen only partially, in a limited and compro-
mised (thus: inadequate) form.13 Here, we find the first premise of Freud-
ian hermeneutics: the symptoms grasped on the level of conscious-
ness (such as parapraxes, free association, dreams) should be studied 
as signs of the processes taking place on deeper levels of the psyche 
and thus impossible to grasp directly. The point here is something 
more than the classic indicative (or signal) relation between the “overt” 
symptom, and “hidden” pathology. The symptoms should be examined 
by the analyst as “marked by intentionality,” i.e. as messages carrying 
certain (though, at the given moment, veiled) meanings. In his disser-
tation on Freudian thought that systemizes the hermeneutic tradition 
of interpreting psychoanalysis,14 Paweł Dybel writes: 
The oft-returning statement in Freud’s works that pathological psychological phe-
nomena […] are meaningful means that they are not exhausted in their literal sense 
(commonly perceived as senseless), but rather refer us outside ourselves towards 
the hidden meaning of a scene from the patient’s childhood. This sense, for unknown 
reasons, was repressed into the patient’s unconscious, where it has rested since then 
in disguise awaiting its resumption, ‘awakening,’ and assimilation by the patient’s 
self-knowledge. Thanks to a similar—present at the level of overt meaning—moment 
of allusive reference to hidden meaning, pathological psychological phenomena gain 
[…] a distinguished place against the backdrop of the remaining phenomena. In con-
trast to those phenomena, they contain some signal, some trace of a traumatic event 
(or sequence of events) from the past, which is of key significance to understanding 
the patient’s spiritual biography. […] This moment of revelation, the hint of a trace, 
is usually not present at all on the level of overt meaning of normal phenomena. 
categories and within the scope of understanding the holistic structure and shape of psychoanalytic 
theory. Both types of changes were present in the thought of Freud himself (the first and second 
topographies of the psychological apparatus, for example), and—to an even greater degree—
in the thought of his successors (regarding the developmental schemes of human personality 
or defining of the basic instances of the psyche).
13 It is here that the dynamic character of the unconscious manifests itself.
14 The hermeneutic tradition has developed in opposition to the rivaling “scientistic,” “natural,” 
or “empirico-nomological” traditions. In the writings of the Founding Father, elements legitimizing 
both of these traditions (each has its own more detailed variants), are present.
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[…] The presence of this moment in pathological phenomena does not say much 
yet about the hidden meaning itself. Nevertheless, it opens some hope for the ana-
lyst of reaching—through dialogue with the patient—those layers of his/her psyche 
in which the sources of his/her illness lie.15 
As this author notes elsewhere in the book, 
[…] at the base of Freud’s interpretive proceedings lies the assumption that behind 
the seemingly difficult to accept literally (or completely incomprehensible) mean-
ings of patients’ behavior or statements, an additional layer of meaning [inten-
tion] is hidden that they are not aware of, and which takes on a significant form 
in its senselessness. This intention is not given directly […] but makes itself known 
allusively with the help of various types of empty signifiant, whose signifié can be 
found in the wider context of the patient’s spiritual biography.16
In the interpretive strategy of psychoanalysts described by Dybel, 
the presence of the “biographical moment” is noteworthy. Its key sig-
nificance is determined by the conviction that though the content 
of the unconscious is, above all, a psychological manifestation of the bio-
logic-instinctive sphere of human existence (regulated by the principles 
of the so-called “primary process”), it is also subject to external influ-
ences. Within the framework of psychoanalytic concepts, it is accepted 
that the elements composing the individual’s psyche (various “psychologi-
cal instances”—whether completely immersed in the unconscious or par-
tially conscious/subconscious), as well as the relations between them, 
are shaped evolutionally as a result of interactions between instincts 
and psychophysical needs, as well as influences of the social environment 
in their entirety, beginning with the first external object, the mother. 
This occurs within the framework of a series of developmental phases 
that determine the consecutive development of the basic components 
of the structure of the personality, while the type/specificity of experi-
15 P. Dybel, Dialog i represja. Antynomie psychoanalizy Zygmunta Freuda (Warszawa: IFiS 
PAN, 1995), pp. 93–94. 
16 P. Dybel, Dialog i represja…, p. 98, emphasis—T.P.
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ence that the individual takes part in during a given phase would imply 
the specific developmental variant of a given component of this structure. 
Special significance is ascribed here to negative experiences that trau-
matize the personality of the developing human being. This is an ambig-
uous and complex issue. The experiences that shape one’s personality 
do not necessarily have to be of a traumatic character per se. Sometimes, 
they take on such qualities only under the influence of later (i.e.: secondary) 
injuries. The latter lead to regression—i.e. an unconscious “return” to pre-
viously established ways of instinctual and emotional satisfaction, object 
choice, etc., perpetuated on the basis of those primary (“fixated”) experi-
ences. Next to “external” experiences, a traumatizing and anxiety inducing 
role can also be played by “internal” experiences, connected with the feel-
ing of impulses and/or desires flowing from unconscious, instinctive layers 
of the psyche. The famous Freudian idea of “repetition compulsion” refers 
precisely to this type of situation: when a given subject under the influence 
of real external stimuli—and/or certain internal experiences—in a given 
area of his activity or emotional life begins to function inadequately, e.g., 
as he/she did when he/she was a child. It is in this sense that psychoana-
lysts maintain that adult behavior may be the expression of an uncon-
scious and symbolic compensation for earlier traumas. Thus, each indi-
vidual’s unique “personal history,” understood as the specific result of his 
inborn psychological disposition and (to a large degree culturally-condi-
tioned) experiences that he/she participated in at the successive phases 
of his/her psyche’s development, determine the shape of the personality 
of every human individual (including—what remains of key importance 
for the therapist—the shape of his possible psychological pathologies). 
Psychoanalytic investigation—and, at the same time, therapy—would 
therefore be based on examining the patient’s personal history, which 
(a) shaped the structure of his/her character in a certain way and “defined” 
the pathologies proper to him/her, (b) was “written” and “buried” in his/
her unconsciousness, and now (c) manifests itself in a distorted and allu-
sive way through “symptoms” that can be grasped on a conscious level 
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and—possibly—also manifested behaviorally. Insight into this history will 
allow for the reconstruction of its “proper,” i.e. hidden, meaning and its 
consequent “healing” inclusion into the patient’s sphere of consciousness 
(self-knowledge). 
As a result, a series of analytic sessions take place, during which—
in the course of interaction or dialogue with the patient—the therapist 
gradually acquires hints and indications that lead him to this mean-
ing.17 Let us return to Paweł Dybel’s argumentation, in which he accu-
rately captures the presence (and fundamental significance!) of the sus-
picious attitude, a certain lack of agreement on the part of the analyst 
to accept the message directly available to him or communicated out-
right, which leads him to undertake a persistent effort to “look inward” 
and reach the deeper, hidden layers: 
The process of psychoanalytic interpretation […] consists in […] gradually overcom-
ing the  separation of a given phenomenon’s signifié from its signifiant while extract-
ing subsequent signifiant of the unconscious from the patient in the course of dia-
logue with him. The signifiant […] of pathological psychological phenomena therefore 
remains in a deeply ambiguous relation (or, to be more precise, dual) to its hidden 
signifié. This relation is composed of […] the masking intention, as well as the unveil-
ing one. The masking intention attempts to create in the interpreter the impression 
that the interpreted signifiant is its own signifié. It wants to reassure him in his 
conviction that this signifiant means only what it means literally, and is therefore 
completely ‘meaningless.’ He is to come to the conclusion that seeking some hidden 
meaning beyond this is unnecessary. The unveiling intention, on the other hand, 
(1) is manifested in an exaggerated (thus, “attention-grabbing”) attempt to cover 
up the hidden meaning, and (2) by way of the purely structural features of the overt 
meaning allusively refers to the hidden meaning. An interpreter following it is to come 
to the conviction that in spite of appearances, behind the overt meaning of the phe-
17 It is the interactive character of meeting that leads to the production of psychoanalytic 
data: the genesis of the stream of consciousness communicated in the form of free associations, 
the appearance of resistance, the shaping and dynamics of the patient’s unconscious emotional 
attitude towards the therapist (transference) and the therapist’s towards the patient (counter-
transference). For a good introduction to psychoanalytic work with patients, see B. Killingmo, 
Psychoanalityczna metoda leczenia (Gdańsk: GWP, 1995); original edition—B. Killingmo, 
Den psykoanalytiske behandlingsmetode: prinsipper og begreper (Oslo: Universitetsforlaget, 1971); 
A. Leźnicka-Łoś, Nauczyć się kochać. Terapia psychoanalityczna w teorii i praktyce (Warszawa: 
Jacek Santorski & Co, 2002).
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nomenon hides a covert meaning, which should be reached by reconstructing the miss-
ing intermediate elements. A psychoanalyst […] does not allow himself to be deceived 
by the masking intention […]. In it, he perceives precisely the attempt to hide and dis-
tort something completely different, more essential than what the overt meaning 
of the phenomenon declares. And it is precisely this attempt that tells him something, 
that reveals something, though it does so in an unusual way.18 
As we can see, the “hermeneutics of suspicion”—the search for “deeper 
meaning,” purposefully hidden and, at the same time, perversely pres-
ent in the message that is available directly—constitutes the foundation 
of analytic proceedings. In other words, it turns out to be the condition sine 
qua non of successful psychoanalytic practice.19 Transferred to the sphere 
of the sciences of man, it would transform and increase—so it says—
the possibilities of insight and analyses available to these disciplines.20
“Hermeneutics of Suspicion” and Historiography
The psychoanalytic “hermeneutics of suspicion” appeared within 
the bounds of historiography thanks to psychohistorians—researchers 
of history who “believed in Freudism.” We can indicate two premises 
of its reception in historiography. The first was connected with the onto-
logical dimension of the historian’s thought, the second, with the meth-
odological dimension. The first case concerns the “postulated reality” 
characteristic of the historians who accepted the theorems of depth psy-
chology. It is evident that in their case, the accepted vision of the histori-
18 P. Dybel, Dialog i represja…, pp. 100–101, emphasis—T.P.
19 It is noteworthy that the “proper” history of psychoanalysis usually begins with the moment 
in which S. Freud began treating the often shocking stories of his patients (the sphere of overt 
meaning) rather as fantasies (let us immediately add—meaningful fantasies), than memories 
of real occurrences; it is precisely then that he stood on the foundation of the “hermeneutics 
of suspicion.”
20 “The significance of various psychoanalytic theories for individual discipline 
in the humanities consisted (and consists) in the fact that a certain way of looking at what 
was usually called the ‘human psyche’ was formed. This view […] led to a completely different 
understanding of all man’s actions and his various cultural products. Contact with classical 
texts in the psychoanalytic tradition […] teaches us, above all, a certain type of sensitivity. 
Once acquired, it allows us to turn our attention to a series of seemingly accidental aspects 
of the investigated phenomena, whose meaning and function had hitherto been rejected.” P. Dybel, 
Okruchy psychoanalizy…, pp. 25–26.
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cal process had to more or less directly result from a psychoanalytic view 
of the world and of man, for which—as we remember—the most consti-
tutive is the conviction about the existence of a sphere of the uncon-
scious that is superior to the human thought and action. Thus, when 
the ontology of psychohistorians places man in the position of subjec-
tivity and agency—as the creator of culture and of history, who by vir-
tue of his action “creates” the reality of his own existence—it simulta-
neously accepts that this human subject is, to a large degree, not “his 
own master.” It assumes that the major part of his psychological activity 
is unconscious and—remaining the main determinant of the decisions 
and actions of this subject (both individual and collective)—is located 
outside of his conscious and “volitional” control. 
This unconscious conditioning is fundamentally of a “framework” 
character, i.e. it is expressed in subject’s tendency to repeat certain pat-
terns of reaction (cognitive and emotional) and behavior that appeared 
in connection with the necessity of coping with various experiences/
traumas. On the level of specific behavior, a more or less developed 
aspect of conscious thought and realistic action (an element of “rational-
ity”) generally coexists with the above.21 However, from the perspective 
of depth psychology, these patterns stemming from the unconscious are 
understood as paramount elements within man’s motivational structure. 
Ontology based on psychoanalysis imposes a complicated model 
of the individual and of society on the historian. Human subjects appear 
as, on the one hand, determined in their actions by a realistic view 
of reality (i.e.: ones that proceed “rationally”—in accordance with ones’ 
own knowledge and values), and on the other (more essential), condi-
tioned by the psychological effects of the “sum” of their positive and neg-
ative experiences, which, making up the “personal history” of a given 
individual, shaped the structure of his/her character in a certain way 
21 Its presence would guarantee the existence in the psyche of every healthy individual 
(i.e.: free from conflict) a sphere of cognitive and adaptational functions of the “Ego.”
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and defined the basic models of referring to others, which are not sub-
ject to conscious control. 
Though at the base of this last process lie elementary, culturally 
invariant mechanisms of psychological life, the specific result of their 
“work” depends on the socio-cultural context, in which man experiences 
the world and himself. On the other hand, according to the psychoana-
lytic view of the world and man, society appears not only as a certain 
structure or network of social interactions, roles, and patterns of behav-
ior. It is also—or rather, above all—a certain type of “spiritual” or men-
tal reality. The transformations and evolution of the latter occur “above 
the heads” (and beyond the consciousness) of the individual subjects 
entangled in it. It appears in the form of a so-called irrational group pro-
cess and is characterized by its own specific dynamics,22 within which 
the action of many key defense mechanisms described in psychoanalytic 
literature can be grasped and recognized.23
In light of the described ontology, the fundamental historiographi-
cal mechanisms are located in the motivational sphere of man as a con-
scious (and, to an even greater degree, an unconscious) creator of his-
tory. This is why psychoanalytically oriented historians state that 
the core of their cognitive endeavor is studying the “historical moti-
vation,” “inquiries into why people acted in certain ways in history.”24 
These inquiries, as is emphasized in their circles, are of a special char-
acter—they give 
22 Freud and his successors tended to understand these dynamics per analogiam to the psychic 
processes of individuals, especially to the emotional dependencies characteristic of family life.
23 Especially those connected with the issue of relations to the object, such as projection 
or introjection. On the defense mechanisms of the “Ego” see the classic work of S. Freud, 
The Ego and the Mechanisms of Defence (London: L. & V. Woolf, Institute of Psycho-Analysis, 
1937). The concept of a collective unconscious was undoubtedly dedicated the most space 
in the analytic psychology of Carl Gustav Jung—one of the earliest independent “branches” 
of the psychoanalytic “tree.”
24 See L. deMause, Niezależność psychohistorii, in: T. Pawelec, ed., Psyche i Klio. Historia 
w oczach psychohistoryków (Lublin: Wydawnictwo UMCS, 2002), pp. 52–53. Cf. the recurring 
motifs in various definitions of psychohistory as historiography based on psychoanalysis 
that appear in P. Elovitz, ed., Applying Psychology to Current Events, History and Society. Essays 
from the Journal Clio’s Psyche (New York: Psychohistory Forum, 2006), pp. 1–3.
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due place to the aggression, sexuality, passions, fantasy, and emotional states 
the inner world of its subjects. [Scholars seek—T.P.] the function of the unconscious 
in human behavior […] pursue visible traces of the unconscious and its defences.25 
As we can see, the fundamental object of historical inquiry turns 
out to be precisely what interests psychoanalysts in reference to their 
patients. The similarity in research objects justifies a similar approach 
in terms of cognition and research strategy: the “hermeneutics of sus-
picion” in regard to historical sources (the search for hidden references 
in the available source information to the sphere of unconscious moti-
vation of historical subjects) in the first case, the “hermeneutics of sus-
picion” regarding symptoms demonstrated by the patient (the search 
for the hidden meaning covertly expressed in them) in the second case.
In the context of the methodological dimension of historical thought, 
the permeation of the “hermeneutics of suspicion” was fostered by cer-
tain conclusions that flowed from reflection on nature and the funda-
mental qualities of historians’ research practice. Namely, certain think-
ers (whether connected with the psychology of depth or historiography 
and the philosophy of history) perceived various similarities and analo-
gies, even a certain methodological “affinity,” between the study of his-
tory (especially its classical variant) and psychoanalysis.26 In this con-
text, the latter was called a “a historical science concerned with origins 
and development, thus providing genetic adaptational narrative his-
torical explanation” 27 (naturally, in reference to the “personal history” 
of the patient). The “authority” on psychoanalytic history, Peter Loewen-
berg, writes: 
25 P. Loewenberg, Psychohistory…, pp. 15–16, emphasis—T.P.
26 See, e.g., R. de Sassure, Psychoanalysis and History, in: Psychoanalysis and the Social 
Science, Vol. 2, G. Roheim, ed. (New York: International Universities Press, 1950), pp. 7–65; 
H. Meyerhoff, On Psychoanalysis as History, in: Psycho/History:  Reading  in  the Method 
of Psychology, Psychoanalysis and History, G. Cocks, T. Crosby, eds. (New Haven–London: Yale 
University Press, 1987), pp. 17–29; A. Besançon, “Psychoanalysis: Auxiliary Science or Historical 
Method?” Contemporary History 1968, Vol. 3, pp. 149–153; M. Roth, Psycho-Analysis as History 
(Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1995). 
27 P. Loewenberg, “Preface,” in: Decoding the Past…, p. XX.
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Both history and psychoanalysis rely on the arts of interpretation and communica-
tion. Psychoanalysis clinically, and history by ‘immersion’ in the vestiges of the past 
[…] share the quality of placing the observer in the midst of the field he analyzes 
and requiring of him a special mixture of identification and detachment as a pre-
requisite to interpretation.28 
As this scholar observed elsewhere, 
[…] both disciplines are to the theory of overdetermination. It would be a poor histo-
rian who would maintain that a major historical event had only one cause. We must 
necessarily look to many levels of causation and appraise the significance of each. 
Freud too insisted upon the overdetermined nature of the affects, dreams, and symp-
toms of psychic life. Thus both disciplines seek multiple explanations for single 
phenomena. […] This distinguishes history and psychoanalysis from the social 
and the natural sciences that seek to fit or subsume individual events under gen-
eral covering laws of behavior.29 
In connection with this, it has been said that a psychoanalytically 
thinking researcher of the past, 
can remain a historian […]; he can continue to use traditional historical method and, 
in doing so, function in a way that is fundamentally compatible with the way in which 
the psychoanalyst functions as a clinician.30 
In the context of the examined issue, the meaning of the cited argu-
mentation seems evident: since the “hermeneutics of suspicion” lie 
at the base of a psychoanalyst’s clinical proceedings, it should also 
find a proper place in the research practice of the historian. After all, 
both act (or should act) similarly… The assimilation of such a directive 
seemed all the easier that in its superficial reception, this hermeneu-
tics could appear to be a certain variant or possibly even radicalization 
28 P. Loewenberg, Psychohistory…, pp. 3–4.
29 P. Loewenberg, Psychohistory…, p. 16.
30 T. Kohut, “Psychohistory as History,” American Historical Review 1986, Vol. 96, p. 347, 
emphasis—T.P.
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of the skeptic approach characteristic of historiography, and developed 
in connection with the so-called critique of the historical source.
Source Critique and the “Hermeneutics of Suspicion”
Usually, source critique is defined as a series of investigative actions 
serving to define the origin, authenticity, and credibility of a histori-
cal source.31 History notes a plethora of debates about the separation 
or distinction of elements perceived as a “trace” or “remnant” of the past 
within the source as either authentic, or worthless, or unreliable. Older 
methodological treatises saw the essence of the scientific historio-
graphical method exactly in critical study of the sources.32 Therefore, 
detailed sets of rules of external and internal critique33 (usually com-
municated by way of a series of examples illustrating specific “model” 
acts, individual critical solutions) fill the greater part—sometimes even 
the majority—of works like Marceli Handelsman’s Historyka or Charles 
Langlois and Charles Seignobos’ Introduction to the Study of History.34 
Since the source is to be an empirical “link” with historical fact sought 
by the historiographer, we should ascertain whether it really is what 
it seems to be in the historian’s eyes, and whether it is not deceiving him 
31 B. Miśkiewicz, Wstęp do badań historycznych (Warszawa–Poznań: PWN, 1985), p. 210. 
See also: J. Topolski, Metodologia historii (Warszawa: PWN, 1984), pp. 357–376
32 It is precisely the codification of the “classical” rules of critique of written sources 
(especially of documents as the most cognitively valuable type of such sources), which occurred 
in the 17th and 18th century, that is recognized as an essential step from historiography—
“writing” to historiography—“science.” Regarding this issue, cf. D.R. Kelley, Faces of History: 
Historical Inquiry from Herodotus to Herder (New Haven–London: Yale University Press, 1998), 
pp. 188–211; A.F. Grabski, Dzieje historiografii (Poznań: Wydawnictwo Poznańskie, 2003), 
pp. 273–289; J. W. Thompson, A History of Historical Writing, Vol. 2. (New York: MacMillan 
& Co., 1942), pp. 3–57.
33 That is, respectively: (a) establishing the origins of the source, i.e. the place and time 
it originates from and its authorship, establishing the authenticity of the source; (b) establishing 
the credibility and cognitive value of the source. Literally speaking, the listed issues refer 
to sources described as written ones, but in a broader understanding also concern other types 
of source materials.
34 As for the latter (originally published as Ch. Langlois, Ch. Seignobos, Introduction 
aux études historiques [Paris: Hachette, 1897]), in the 350-page-length English version 
of the treatise I have used, (Introduction to the Study of History [London: Duckworth, 1898]), 
the issue of critique takes up almost 140 pages, while the problem of establishing facts on the basis 
of the results of this critique (i.e. “extracting” them from the source)—less than 20 pages. Thus, 
from a traditional perspective, this last element clearly seems to be unproblematic.
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intentionally or unwittingly.35 Herein lies the essence of the skepticism 
typical of a classically-understood critical approach regarding historical 
sources. Here, we also find its limits. “Suspicion” ended in the moment 
when a source successfully passed the critique.36 From that moment 
on, the historian was allowed to accept that the information contained 
within it37 “directly” communicated “what it was really like” in the past. 
Thus, the signifiant merged with its signifié, and the researcher of history 
believed that he had gained full (if not necessarily exhaustive) access to past 
facts by virtue of source information. As Edward H. Carr wrote in ret-
rospect (and somewhat sarcastically): “The nineteenth-century fetishism 
of facts was completed and justified by a fetishism of documents. The docu-
ments were the Ark of the Covenant in the temple of facts. The reverent 
historian approached them with bowed head and spoke of them in awed 
tones. If you find it in the documents, it is so.” 38 
As we can see, it is the point of departure that connects the psychoana-
lytic “hermeneutics of suspicion” with the classical approach of the histo-
rian: this point of departure is an attitude of initial mistrust regarding 
the data he/she acquired or came across. Further on, however, a funda-
mental difference appears. In accordance with the position presented 
35 I.e., whether the informer—the creator of the source transmission—is not deceiving him. 
The formula cited in a modern methodological textbook is significant in this context: “As source 
critique, we consider such acquisition of knowledge about the source that it [i.e the source—T.P.] 
becomes a source of ready-to-use information.” J. Topolski, Wprowadzenie do historii (Poznań: 
Wydawnictwo Poznańskie, 1998), p. 46, emphasis—T.P.
36 It is appropriate to note that this test of critique, in the way it was conducted, was 
oftentimes very complex. Its results did not have to be unambiguous—when, for example, they 
showed the place and scope of “falsification” of a given document (“here” it is authentic, “there” 
it is not) or determined the degree to which the author of a given document was informed or partial 
(“here” it is credible, “there” it is not). The aforementioned “exemplary” model of presenting 
the rules of critique served precisely to demonstrate this complexity and ambiguity. Regarding 
the systematic reconstruction of critical reasoning developed around the source, conducted 
from the perspective of formal logic and the general methodology of science, see: J. Giedymin, 
Z problemów logicznych analizy historycznej (Poznań: PWN, 1961). Cf. J. Giedymin, Problemy, 
założenia, rozstrzygnięcia (Poznań: PWN, 1964), pp. 105–123.
37 The traditional conception declared that the source essentially contains “ready-made” 
information about the past, which historians—after conducting critique—later “extract” from it. 
A systematic juxtaposition of the convictions constituting the classical concept of historical 
source—J. Kolbuszewska, “Problem źródła w klasycznej XIX-wiecznej historiografii,” in: Historyk 
wobec źródeł. Historiografia klasyczna  i nowe propozycje metodologiczne, J. Kolbuszewska, 
R. Stobiecki, eds. (Łódź: Ibidem, 2010), pp. 13–21. 
38 E. H. Carr, What is History? (London: Penguin Books, 1978), p. 16, emphasis—T.P.
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above, the historian wants to discern/ascertain whether he/she can 
accept the information/data present on the level of the literal meaning 
of the message (“ready-made” source information); the psychoanalyst, 
on the other hand, automatically treats the literal meaning of symptoms 
as a veil or mask, which must be looked underneath. In the first case, 
there is a readiness to accept (under the conditions defined by the rules 
of critique) the “overt meaning.” In the second case, the overt meaning, 
as a rule, is only accepted to the degree that the therapist perceives 
an allusion in it, a masked reference to the enigmatic covert meaning. 
Of course, it is worth noting that the classical concept of the source, 
19th-century in origin, as something ready-made and waiting to be 
used in research,39 does not adequately express the understanding 
of the nature of historiography’s empirical base as shared by later 
generations of history scholars (and methodologists of history). Dur-
ing the 20th century in particular, the conviction about the active role 
of the historian in the process of examining sources became widespread. 
This role was no longer reduced simply to the act of “pulling in” given 
material (sources in a potential sense) into the framework of an already 
undertaken historical study and then critically “reading” the “ready-
made” information contained in it.40 Rather, it was said that historio-
graphers “interpret sources,” that they “pose questions to them and seek 
answers to those questions.”41 In this way, the sphere of the historian’s 
39 This is precisely how the traditions of rankism and positivism were summarized in this 
respect by J. Topolski—Teoria wiedzy historycznej (Poznań: Wydawnictwo Poznańskie, 1983), p. 255.
40 Though the traditional attitude is slowly subsiding, it sometimes “returns” with surprising 
strength of conviction—also in the thought of historians aware of new trends and innovative 
in terms of the research they are doing. In this context, see the recent remarks of Marek Cetwiński 
on the subject of sources/past things as elementary historical facts “in themselves.” M. Cetwiński, 
“‘Potężniejszy od Boga?’ Historyk a granice naukowego poznania przeszłości,” in: Ad fontes. O naturze 
źródła historycznego, S. Rosik, P. Wiszniewski, eds. (Wrocław: Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu 
Wrocławskiego, 2004), pp. 17–25 (especially pp. 23–25).
41 A paraphrase of Adam Kersten’s statements from his study, Na tropach Napierskiego 
(Warszawa: PIW, 1970), p. 25. John H. Arnold (among others) wrote thusly regarding this issue: 
“The sources do not ‘speak for themselves’ and never have done. They speak for others, now dead 
and forever gone. Sources may have voices—plural—which can suggest directions and prompt 
questions, leading to further sources. But they lack volition: they come alive when the historian 
reanimates them. And although sources are a beginning, the historian is present before and after, 
using skills and making choices. Why this document and not another? […] Which questions 
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reasoning around (and on the basis of) direct source data, presented 
now as the area of the historian’s creative cognitive procedures, was val-
orized.42 The data itself was also increasingly perceived as epistemo-
logically dependent on him/her (in the radical formulation—as created 
by him/her in the course of work with a source within the boundaries 
of the non-source based knowledge proper to him or her43). In this con-
text, the idea appeared of “transcending the source perspective,” reach-
ing its “deeper” or “hidden” layers; then, source information that is more 
directly “graspable” (let us say: available on the source’s “surface,” i.e.: 
created with the minimal participation of the researcher’s “non-source 
based” knowledge) functions as indicative information regarding infor-
mation that is not directly “graspable.” 44
It is difficult not to notice that such a perception of the historian’s 
work with a source seems to better agree with the stance of the “herme-
neutics of suspicion.” It is said that a researcher’s skepticism does 
not end the moment he successfully conducts an external and internal 
critique of the source. The data made available thanks to this critique 
is only perceived as the point of departure for further cognitive pene-
tration of this source. Penetration founded on the suspicion (or rather 
on the conviction) that the “surface” information can/must lead to oth-
ers, composing the “hidden reality” of the source message. The latter 
to pursue, which paths to take?” J. H. Arnold, History: A Very Short Introduction (Oxford–
New York: Oxford University Press, 2000), p. 77, emphasis—T. P.
42 The attempt at a holistic methodological reconstruction of the interpretive practices 
developed in reference to historical sources can be found in a series of dissertations by Tadeusz 
Buksiński. See especially: T. Buksiński, Zasady  i metody  interpretacji  teksów źródłowych 
(Poznań: UAM, 1991); T. Buksiński, Interpretacja źródeł historycznych pisanych (Warszawa–
Poznań: PWN, 1992). In general, on the interpretation in the humanities, see also W. Wrzosek, 
“Interpretacja a narracja,” in: Metodologiczne problemy narracji historycznej, J. Pomorski, 
ed. (Lublin: UMCS, 1990), pp. 129–156.
43 J. Topolski, Teoria wiedzy historycznej…, p. 256ff. This scholar distinguished various 
informational “layers” that can be created in the source material (of a “surface” “signal,” 
and “indicative” type or character). The most radical position in this context states that the “source-
character” of the said materials (not so much the fact of being a source “to,” as being a source 
“in general”—as well as potential source) is established by historians within the boundaries 
of the culture that they participate in. W. Wrzosek, “Źródło historyczne jako alibi realistyczne 
historyka,” in: Historyk wobec źródeł…, J. Kolbuszowska, R. Stobiecki, eds., pp. 23–38.
44 On the subject of indicators in the context of work with a historical source, see: T. Buksiński, 
Metodologiczne problemy uzasadniania wiedzy historycznej (Warszawa–Poznań: PWN, 1982), p. 24ff.
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may inform us about the deeper levels of the historical process45 that 
are “ungraspable” in direct human perception.46 In such proceed-
ings, it turns out that the historian’s creative interpretive effort, that 
attempts to transcend the perspective of the literal message and see 
“beyond it,” beginning with questions guided by non-source based 
knowledge/theory, is key. 
However, a fundamental difference remains. The “literal mes-
sage” of the source is understood here as an indicator or signal 
of the content contained in its deeper layers, but it is not assumed 
that it realizes some “masking intention” (requiring hermeneutical 
“overcoming”) in relation to them, all the less so that within its frame-
work, some dialectics of hiding and simultaneous revealing of these 
would have to occur, parallel to the dialectics of masking-revealing 
which the analyst proceeding to study a patient’s symptoms encoun-
ters (as a key and an obstacle at the same time). Therefore, though 
the psychoanalytic “hermeneutics of suspicion” appears as compatible 
with the standard approach adopted by historians regarding sources, 
in the end, it noticeably goes beyond them. Thus, it undoubtedly pos-
sesses—as a new element within the framework of historical method—
the potential to modify the rules of historians’ research proceedings. 
“Hermeneutics of Suspicion” in Working with a Historical Source
Let us now take a look at some practical consequences of the “herme-
neutics of suspicion’s” existence in the field of source investigations con-
ducted by psychoanalytically-oriented historiographers. To begin with, 
it is worth noting that the standard source material is made up of mem-
oirs, accounts, letters, autobiographies, administrative documents, 
photographs, and the like. All of these materials have a sure place 
45 For a representative of modernist social history, this would be, for example, the structural 
dimension of reality, for an economic historian—the sphere of “impersonal” economic relations 
and processes, for an “anthropologizing” historian—cultural patterns or mental equipment proper 
to given societies of the past.
46 And thus inaccessible to the perception of the informer—the “creator” of the source.
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in the methodology of the classical (or traditional) historian as docu-
menting the behaviors and statements of historical figures. The unique-
ness of the modus operandi of authors in whom we are interested mani-
fests itself not so much in their choice of empirical material, as in the way 
they work with them. They “approach” them with readiness to “seek 
what is hidden” (thus, they manifest the approach of the “hermeneu-
tics of suspicion”) and equipped with special intellectual “tools”—theo-
retical premises and interpretive strategies of psychoanalysis. These 
“hint” to the researchers (and this is the first step in work with a source), 
that they should seek (a) repetitive symbolism of words, images, themes, 
(b) enduring forms of activity (and their mutual connections) of the stud-
ied subject, including (c) such forms of behavior or approaches/stances 
that can be classified as phobias or peculiarities/eccentrities. These 
will be the source equivalents of “symptoms” constituting—in light 
of psychoanalytic theory—the indicative material, on the basis of which 
(this is the second step of the described proceedings) conclusions are 
formed as to personality traits, elements of psychopathology, emotional 
conditions, or the causes of the appearance of a given motivation, fre-
quently understood as the result of, on the one hand, a certain dynamics 
appearing in the psyche of a historical figure, on the other—his/her per-
ception of the “real” world. The point of such investigations is not (at least 
not only) a “factual” reconstruction of the events in the life of the pro-
tagonist or even the “observable” approaches, views, and emotions that 
this figure demonstrated. Such findings are to be the basis upon which 
“deeper” conclusions can be drawn regarding the dynamics and struc-
ture of the unconscious, but constitutive elements of his/her personal-
ity. In other words, historians strive to “decipher”47 the psychological 
and motivational meaning (or possibly formative role) of a given behav-
ior, experience, or stimulus that is documented in the source. The par-
47 In the relevant methodological literature, the term “in-depth reading” and “in-depth 
analysis”—telling testimonies of the search for “hidden meaning”—appear frequently in this context. 
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allels with the proceedings of psychoanalysts are so far-reaching, that 
it often ends with a certain “diagnosis” of the studied historical figures.48
The “hermeneutics of suspicion” also determine the particular 
hierarchy of sources, which exists within the framework of psycho-
historical research practice. The position of a given type of material 
within the framework of the entire source base depends on, above 
all, how “directly” (i.e. “overtly”) emotional states or the dynamics 
of the human psyche could be manifested in it, and the degree to which 
it is open to “in-depth reading.” Such a perspective also means putting 
aside (as irrelevant) the standard distinctions that historians routinely 
make with relation to their sources (direct-indirect, targeted-not tar-
geted, etc.). 
Thus, the first place is generally given to (a) materials directly cre-
ated by the studied historical figures, therefore possessing the status 
of products of their—broadly-understood—creative activeness. Mate-
rials of this type, so is assumed, allow for the attainment of a par-
ticularly deep insight into the historical figure’s ways of experiencing 
reality, as well as patterns of reacting to this reality proper to him/
her—both in the sphere of feelings and emotions, and of action. Among 
those mentioned above, particularly psychologically essential are atti-
tudes and relationships developed in reference to various significant 
figures in the life of the protagonist; for this reason, sources that allow 
for a reconstruction of these are preferred. This explains the high posi-
48 Such consequences of operating with a theoretical perspective that appeared in a therapeutic 
context and is so marked by “suspicion” are difficult to avoid, indeed. For more on the development 
of psychoanalytic theories from the practices of psychotheraphy, see (among others): 
H. J. Ellenberger, The History of the Unconscious: The History and Evolution of Dynamic Psychiatry 
(New York: Basic Books, 1970), chapters 7 and 10; L. Chertok, R. de Saussure, The Therapeutic 
Revolution: From Mesmer to Freud (New York: Brunner Mazel, 1979); P. Gay, Freud…, chapters 
3–6; R. Fine, History of Psychoanalysis (New York: Columbia University Press, 1979), chapter 3. 
The diagnostic-therapeutic attitude is visible to this day in many statements of a methodological 
character formulated by representatives of the psychohistorical paradigm. Of the more interesting 
examples, see e.g. V. Volkan, “A Methodology for Integrating Information in a Psychoanalytic 
Biography,” Mind and Human Interaction 1997, Vol. 8, No. 2, pp. 82–100. It is also the object 
of critical auto-reflection in their circles. On this subject, see my article: T. Pawelec, “Historian 
as a Social Psychotherapist (Ethical Assumptions of Psychohistorical Writings),” Historyka Vol. 34: 
2004, pp. 5–21.
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tion of (b) such personal materials that allow the researcher to trace 
the attitudes of the studied figures and their relations to other peo-
ple important to them in the longest timeframe possible; an example 
of a source of this kind is correspondence (especially if it is extensive 
and long-lasting). Highly regarded are also (c) various (third-per-
son) accounts presenting the behavior of the studied figure, espe-
cially if they seem to uncover its more enduring attitudes, or cognitive 
or emotional gestalts. Here, the most preferable are those transmissions 
that contain elements of a psychological interpretation (even if intui-
tive). Even if the interpretation of the attitudes and behavior proposed 
by the informer is fragmentary and based on “common-sense” or “vulgar” 
psychology, it often turns out to be a good point of departure for an in-
depth, “scientific” interpretation worked out by the psychohistorian. 
Another important category of sources (and one which is particularly 
highly valued) can be described as: (d) materials documenting the most 
important experiences/formative events for a given historical figure that 
occurred in the early phases of his or her life (in practice, this often 
means their childhood years). The point is to have, on the one hand, 
materials directly concerning those events and as chronologically close 
to them as possible, on the other, all others that could be potentially use-
ful thanks to the application of the procedure of so-called retrodiction.49 
Transmissions and artifacts of popular culture (e) are also consid-
ered essential sources (especially in the field of psychohistorical studies 
49 This procedure may be considered an interesting form of practicing the “hermeneutics 
of suspicion” in a situation of a lack of relevant source materials. In short, it consists in the attempt 
at establishing what real events of a formative character had to have taken place in an earlier 
period of the studied figure’s life for him/her to later exhibit particular behavioral patterns 
and personality traits. The reasoning’s major premise is constituted by the appropriate part 
of theory (supported by the modern clinical experience of psychoanalysis), which declares 
the existence of causal relationships between the given type of childhood experience and character 
qualities and/or the psychopathological type. The minor premise, on the other hand, is constituted 
by a statement or series of statements that constitute a personality characterization (holistically 
or in the dimension of certain qualities of “symptoms”) in the investigated, adult period of life 
of this figure. In the case of retrodiction, the researcher depends above all on theory (I would almost 
like to say: “suspects on the basis of theory”), because either he does not have any independent 
empirical evidence regarding the “earlier” occurrences of certain events, or for some reason 
(for example, the evidence is fragmentary or not credible) he considers it no more than a second-
rate confirmative element. 
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of groups and mass phenomena. These are considered figures of soci-
etal discourse, i.e.: an expression of emotional and existential concerns/
dreams not so much of individual people (the authors of the respec-
tive textual, visual, or film messages 50), as of the collective, to which 
these authors belong and which “consumes” these messages. The psy-
choanalytic procedures of “in-depth reading” such materials are based 
on “fishing out” repetitive motifs, images, perceptions, and associations, 
and strive to find meaning for them that cannot be grasped on the level 
of a single, separately considered transmission, but which turns out 
to be readable when such creative output is considered as a whole—
as created by the group. “Soft” (based on empathic “understanding”) 
strategies of finding this type of hidden collective meaning are sometimes 
supplemented by attempts at quantitative analyses of those motives/con-
tents of a verbal and/or visual nature that are deemed particularly sig-
nificant.51
A special place in the context of the psychohistorical ranking of stan-
dard historical sources presented above is held by the “nonstandard” 
sources characteristic of psychoanalytic history. These are materials cre-
ated by unconscious processes and, thus, directly correspond to the clini-
cal data in analytic therapy. These sources include accounts of dreams, 
obsessive actions and parapraxes, as well as stream of consciousness 
records of the given historical figure (a “substitute” of psychoanalytic 
free association). From the perspective of the “hermeneutics of suspi-
cion” it is precisely these sources that would be the most cognitively valu-
able and by definition psychohistorians “officially” treat them as excep-
50 Here, most frequently taken into account are artistic output (literary, film, and in the fine 
arts), mass-media and multi-media transmissions, and even such collective emanation of human 
creativity as philosophical thought or scientific works (rather their socio-moral implications).
51 On the website of the International Psychohistorical Association, we can find special 
statistical tools that serve to analyze “group fantasy,” i.e. regressive feelings and emotions 
shared by members of a given group, on the basis of the frequency and distribution of “sensitive” 
words or visual symbols present in mass-media discourse. Methodological literature dedicated 
to these issues exists. See, e.g. P. Elovitz, H. Lawton, G. Luhrman, “On Doing Fantasy Analysis,” 
The Journal of Psychohistory Vol. 13: 1985, no. 2, pp. 207–228; J. Hartman, “Evidential Basis 
of Psychohistory in Group,” in: Applying Psychology…, P. Elovitz, ed., pp. 34–37; H. Lawton, 
The Psychohistorian’s Handbook (New York: Psychohistory Press, 1988), pp. 185–192.
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tionally valuable.52 In reality of their research practice, the significance 
of such materials turns out to be moderate, most often due to their lim-
ited and insufficient availability and/or size. Usually, the research can-
not count on more than on the auxiliary and supplementary dimension 
of the source information acquired on their basis.53
The issue of data of a clinical type is part of a wider problem—
the programmatic emulation in studies on historical sources of methods 
and techniques present in clinical situations. What is important here 
are the cognitive functions of transference reactions. In clinical work, 
the therapist (programmatically “suspicious,” as we remember) analyzes 
and uses as an important source for investigative insight both trans-
ference (the dynamics of the patient’s unconscious emotional attitude 
towards himself), and countertransference (his own simultaneously devel-
oping attitude towards the patient).54 Of course, it is impossible to speak 
of the transference of—often deceased—historical subjects in the relation 
of those historiographers who study them years later,55 but psychohisto-
rians of a clinical “sensitivity” (a derivative of their therapeutic attitude 
and possible competence56) indeed sometimes try to recognize and ana-
lyze their subjective, often unconscious attitudes towards the phenom-
ena and historical figures they study. This is undoubtedly a significant 
52 In contrast to classical (traditional) historians, who place them on the lowest level 
of significance, if it is not omit entirely as cognitively unimportant. 
53 In other words, the source material of a clinical (or quasi-clinical) nature can only possibly 
acquire a confirmative valor in the context of existing data that could suggest, for example, 
a given pattern in the protagonist’s emotional life. Not having at his/her disposal the richness 
of clinical material that a psychoanalyst gathers in his weeks, months, and years of practice 
(in psychoanalysis the “explanatory power” of this material correlates with its extensiveness), 
a researcher is forced to treat the available data of this sort as derivative and supplementary. 
“Receiving from” a historical figure under investigation only a fragment of what a clinical 
psychoanalyst learns from a patient, a psychohistorian will have a more fragmentary and less 
exhaustive insight into his/her “psychological reality.” However, in studying the more standard 
source materials, he gains the ability (perhaps completely unavailable in the case of therapy) 
of testing his conclusions flowing from this insight in light of “external” information. In short, 
the lack of clinical materials is (or can be) compensated for by historical data.
54 For more on the idea of transference and counter-transference, see J. Laplanche, 
J.-B. Pontalis, The Language of Psycho-Analysis…, pp. 455–462 and 92–93; B. Moore, B. Fine, 
Słownik psychoanalizy…, pp. 224–226 and 222–223.
55 Apart from the essential exception of investigations carried out in the form of oral history.
56 The postulate was often formulated that a psychoanalytical historian have the fullest 
possible clinical training.
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area of the “hermeneutics of suspicion’s” presence in historical research. 
The cognitive value of the above-mentioned procedures was emphasized: 
the recognition and uncovering of transference reactions can serve as a tool 
of “fishing out” the essential elements within the content of the source that 
have hitherto not been perceived (for psychological reasons on the part 
of the researcher).57 Within the framework of psychohistorical research 
practice (especially in psychobiography), a solution has been tried out—
not without interesting results—that consists in running psychoanalytic 
monitoring (conducted by a professional psychoanalyst) of the historian’s 
research activity in terms of recognizing his unconscious attitudes that 
block/facilitate given moves—not only in the sphere of source investigation, 
but also in the area of conceptualization, interpretation, and explanation.58
Efforts in this direction have done the most in leading towards the direct 
adaptation of a psychoanalytic interview procedure tout-court (i.e. a clinical 
session) for the needs of historical research, which resulted in the appear-
ance of a unique, psychohistorical form of oral history. Robert Lifton, a pio-
neer of this endeavor has developed a special interview style: “It remains 
probing, encouraging the widest range of associations, and includes detailed 
life histories and explorations of dreams. But it focuses on the specific situ-
ation responsible for bringing interviewee and interviewer together […] 
and takes the form of something close to an open dialogue […]”59. Regard-
less of the change of objective from therapeutic to historico-cognitive, 
in essence, these conversations retain the fundamental qualities of the spe-
cial interaction in psychoanalysis that is the clinical session: “Such psy-
chological conversations aim to identify relevant images and themes that 
57 See P. Loewenberg, Psychoanalytic Models of History: Freud and After, in: Psychology 
and Historical Interpretation, W. Mc Kinley Runyan, ed. (New York–Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 1988), pp. 145–151; P. Loewenberg, “Historical Method, the Subjectivity of the Researcher, 
and Psychohistory,” Psychohistory Review Vol. 14: 1985, no. 1, pp. 30–35; C. Pletsch, “A Note 
on the Adaptation of the Psychoanalytic Method to the Study of Historical Personalities: 
Psychoanalysts on Schreber,” Psychohistory Review Vol. 8: 1979, no. 3, pp. 46–50; E. Schepeler, 
“The Biographer’s Transference: A Chapter in Psychobiographical Epistemology,” Biography 
Vol. 13: 1990, No. 2, pp. 111–129.
58 See especially: S.H. Baron, C. Pletsch, eds., Introspection in Biography: The Biographer’s 
Quest for Self-Awareness (Hillsdale–London: Analytic Press, 1985).
59 R. J. Lifton, Ch. Strozier, “Psychology and History,” in: Psychology and Its Allied Disciplines, 
M. Borstein, ed., (New York–London: Lawrence Erlbaum, 1984), p. 172.
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can emerge in this narrative form. It is a search for meaning in a life history, 
in a whole self, whose history is still unfolding. The conversation is process 
oriented and, though carefully structured by means of a protocol, moves 
with the respondent in terms of thoughts, fantasies, feelings, even dreams.” 60
The challenges which accompany the forms of work with a source 
described above led to the formulation in these circles of postulates 
and directives in relation to archival institutions, under whose protection 
lie the majority of materials historians use as empirical bases. An appeal 
for special care in regards to materials that “uncover emotions rather than 
facts” was the key.61 Losses in this area are rather harmless from the per-
spective of classical historians; for psychohistorians, however, these 
losses can sometimes be irreparable. Another challenge directly resulted 
from this—to store (and make available) all collected archivalia in their 
entirety. The selection and disposal of “insignificant” drafts, sketched 
notes, or outlines, restrictions in access to “sensitive” medical informa-
tion or materials concerning “minor” “private” cases—all of these things 
can deprive a psychohistorian of fundamentally significant information 
from the perspective of the questions and research needs proper to him. 
Often, it is these materials, which seem “the least essential from the per-
spective of conventional history” (as William Saffady, archivist/psycho-
historian, wrote), that turn out to be the most useful for psychohistorical 
research, based on psychoanalytic “sensitivity.”62 Without them, that spe-
cial search for hidden meaning that grows out of the “hermeneutics of sus-
picion,” becomes impossible.
It behooves me to end with the question of how all of these proce-
dures and the empirical data acquired/analyzed thanks to them, founded 
60 C. Strozier, Apocalypse: On the Psychology of Fundamentalism in America (Boston: Beacon 
Press, 1994), p. 23, emphasis—T.P.
61 For example, an emotional tone of voice will be lost when studying transcripts instead 
of recorded statements; the change in handwriting visible in handwritten records (sometimes 
an essential sign of internal state) is lost when printed editions replace handwritten ones. 
Similarly, the rough draft of a typed document with all its errors, corrections, and notes shows 
more than the final version.
62 W. Saffady, “Manuscripts and Psychohistory,” The American Archivist Vol. 37: 1974, No. 4, 
pp. 551–564.
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on the “hermeneutics of suspicion,” appear from the perspective of other 
models of history. The entangled and never-ending in complete success 
process of the “growth” of psychoanalytic history in academic historiogra-
phy shows that they were often received as grossly diverging from what 
can and should be done in “Clio’s garden.” The long list of controversies, 
reservations, and dilemmas formulated by skeptical historians63 can be 
reduced to the following issue: the psychoanalytical “in-depth reading” 
of source materials presented above (both quasi-clinical, and more stan-
dard; with the direct use of clinical techniques, or not) requires the accep-
tance of premises too radically different from those that the classical (and 
non-classical) historian typically acknowledges. In effect, the source infor-
mation created/gained in reference to them is often treated as debatable 
at the least, and is frequently directly labeled as “fantasy,” and/or ground-
less speculation. Thus, we can conclude that the attempt to import 
the “hermeneutics of suspicion” more widely into the historical profes-
sion did not end in success, and its more enduring presence has been lim-
ited to the niche paradigm of psychoanalytic history. However, we must 
note that the problem for historians seems to be not the “hermeneutics 
of suspicion” itself, per se (understood as the expression of a special type 
of critical sensitivity), but its practical implications that appear in the con-
text of the theoretical presumptions of psychoanalytic historiography 
in the form of the necessity of acknowledging (or at least being open to) 
63 A synthetic juxtapositon of this debate can be found in: T. Pawelec, “Psychohistorycy 
w debacie z historią,” in: Światooglądy historiograficzne, J. Pomorski, ed. (Lublin: Wydawnictwo 
UMCS, 2002), pp. 157–187. A bibliography of the works that take up this issue—on the one hand, 
written by critics (both the friendly ones seeking a methodological compromise, and those who 
are irreconcilably skeptical), on the other, by representatives of psychoanalytic historiography 
itself (defending and developing their standpoint) is extensive. Only some of them have been 
cited above explicite. A more extensive list can be found in the mentioned monograph T. Pawelec, 
Dzieje i nieświadomość…. The works listed show that the representatives of psychohistory 
and their opponents shared the conviction as to the innovative character present in the model 
of work with a source proper to this orientation, though they valorized it differently. Of newer 
works on this subject in Poland, we note the texts of D. A. Sikorski, “Miejsce i rola źródeł 
w psychohistorii,” in: Ad fontes…, pp. 73–81 (investigating the problem from the perspective 
of medievalists’ research needs and reservations) and T. Ochinowski, T. Pawelec, “Historia 
psychologiczna a problematyka źródeł,” in: Historyk wobec źródeł…, p. 39–78 (inscribing the issue 
into a wider context of methodological “loans” from the field of psychology; some of the perceptions 
formulated there have been used in this publication).
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the cognitive value of various psychoanalytic concepts serving as the foun-
dation for an “in-depth reading” of the sources. This is met with opposition 
from many scholars of the past, so frequently skeptical about depth psychol-
ogy. From here we can conclude that the “hermeneutics of suspicion” would 
gain greater possibilities of “coming into existence” within the historians’ 
“applied methodology” if we were able to disentangle it from its overly close 
relation to the psychohistorical paradigm immersed in psychoanalysis, 
and if it could be practiced within the frameworks of other, so to say, “theo-
retical planes.” It seems that at least some trends in currently-practiced 
non-classical history—especially oral history, microhistory, or historical 
anthropology—open up such possibilities.
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Freudowska „hermeneutyka podejrzeń” 
a krytyka źródła historycznego
Streszczenie: Artykuł poświęcony jest niektórym aspektom wpływu, jaki psycho-
analiza (psychologia głębi) wywarła na praktykę badawczą dziejopisarstwa. Autor 
zastanawia się w jaki sposób „psychoanalityczne myślenie” zmodyfikowało pra-
cę ze źródłem historycznym. Argumentuje, iż podstawą tych modyfikacji stała się 
„wbudowana” w psychologię głębi szczególna „hermeneutyka podejrzeń”. Istotą tejże 
hermeneutyki jest postawa—znamionująca psychoanalitycznego terapeutę—poszu-
kiwania „głębszego znaczenia” danego psychopatologicznego objawu, znaczenia 
przemyślnie ukrywanego przez ten objaw, ale zarazem pośrednio (i przewrotnie) 
przezeń uobecnianego oraz komunikowanego. W tekście identyfikowane są zasad-
nicze przesłanki przenikania „hermeneutyki podejrzeń” w obręb myślenia histo-
ryków: „ontologiczna” (związana ze szczególną wizją procesu historycznego, jaką 
przyjmowali psychoanalitycznie nastawieni dziejopisarze) oraz „metodologiczna” 
(związana z dostrzeżeniem i afirmacją metodologicznego „powinowactwa” pomiędzy 
uprawianiem nauki historii oraz praktykowaniem psychoanalizy). Autor argumen-
tuje następnie, że—wbrew powierzchownym jej odczytaniom—psychoanalityczna 
„hermeneutyka podejrzeń” nie stanowi po prostu zradykalizowanej wersji postawy 
krytycznej względem źródła, standardowo znamionującej naukowe dziejopisarstwo 
w różnych jego odmianach, ale w istotny sposób poza nią wykracza. W tekście rozwa-
żone są również rozmaite praktyczne konsekwencje obecności takiej hermeneutyki 
w sferze pracy ze źródłem historycznym.
Słowa kluczowe: „hermeneutyka podejrzeń”, krytycyzm filozoficzny, postawa kry-
tyczna, historiografia, psychohistoria, proces historyczny, źródło historyczne, psycho-
analiza
